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# HUNT FOR REDS IN U.S. EMPLOY: TOO TOUGH OR TOO SOFT?

**Is the U. S. Government going too far in its search for security risks? Or not far enough? Are civil rights being violated?**

**A federal commission now is to study such questions. Some problems it will meet are revealed in a recent survey by Mr. and Mrs. Richard Harkness. Mr. Harkness is a Washing-**

**ton correspondent of the National Broadcasting Company. The two writers examined scores of controversial security cases, talked with many U. S. officials and employees.**

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**by Richard and Gladys Harkness**

**S**TRANGE ARE THE EVENTS that followed, some years later, publication in the *Washington Post* in 1950 of a letter signed "Joseph S. Petersen, Jr." The letter read:

"Under the guise of 'security,' numerous sins are being committed. The welfare of the nation is of supreme importance, but the right of an individual to 'life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness' is one of supreme importance, too. . . ."

Such criticism of the Administration's crackdown on "security risks" among Government employees is still not uncommon. "Suppose they *are* unconventional in their personal lives? That's no affair of the Government's; they still have a right to their jobs."

Oddly enough, the 1954 security case of Joseph S. Petersen, Jr.—who wrote that letter in 1950—is convincing answer to these criticisms. The details of the story, until now locked in secret files, are here published for the first time.

Petersen, cleared for loyalty under Truman, was inherited by the Eisenhower Administration as an employee in an enterprise even more hush-hush than the Central Intelligence Agency. He was on the staff of the National Security Agency, which is responsible for deciphering secret codes used by foreign powers. Even in Washington, few were aware of the agency's existence, since the name of the National Security Agency was kept out of print. When, after Eisenhower's election, the National Security Agency received allegations that Petersen might be a "security risk," he was rechecked immediately.

When it was discovered that highly classified material had disappeared from National Security Agency files, the matter was turned over to the FBI.

The investigation of Petersen was painstaking. He lived quietly in a modest apartment in Arlington, Va. His job rating was "satisfactory." It would have been "outstanding" except for a trait of instability—a tendency to disappear from his desk without explanation for weeks at a time. That one word—instability—was a clue. For Petersen had become a potential security risk through allegations concerning aberrant habits.

On the afternoon of Sept. 28, 1954, FBI agents called on Petersen and, while exchanging pleasantries, sized up the tall, gaunt, bespectacled code expert.

"Mr. Petersen," an agent said, "we know all about you, but

now. You'll feel better in your own mind if you tell us about it."

The agents detected a fleeting look of surprise on Petersen's face. One investigator went on, "Look, Pete. Why don't you go home and sleep on it? You can call us in the morning."

Next morning Petersen phoned the Washington FBI Field Office. "I want to see you," he said. "I have something for you."

The FBI men had no idea what to expect as they drove to Virginia. If Petersen had been a trained observer, he would have seen the surprise in their eyes as he produced a document from which the cover had been removed. The remaining sheets contained a jumble of apparently meaningless ciphers.

"That's fine, Pete," one of the agents said evenly. "Fine as far as it goes. But there's more. We'll be back this afternoon."

Officials of the National Security Agency identified the code as one of four missing documents. NSA had taken every possible step to safeguard its secrets. Double wire fences surrounded its two gray headquarters buildings. Security police patrolled the premises day and night. All classified material was kept locked in safes with three tumblers.

Yet here was an NSA staff man in possession of a basic counterespionage document! The document was not only "top secret" but carried a code word that cannot be made public even now. It was a classification applied only to material "the disclosure of which could result in exceptionally grave danger to the nation."

The next day, Petersen came clean. He allowed the FBI men to search his apartment. There, on the shelf in a closet, were the other missing NSA documents. We had broken the North Korean Political Security code used by the Reds in the Korean War, and Petersen had a copy. Another document consisted of notes, in his own handwriting, of material which the Government still refuses to identify because of potential repercussions on Capitol Hill and in capitals around the world.

Meanwhile, the FBI had been back-checking Petersen's activities. It uncovered evidence that he had relayed the purloined information to two employees of a foreign government.

Petersen decided to plead guilty to a charge that he "knowingly used classified information concerning the communication intelligence activities of the United States and of

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### ... Federal employment "is not a right but a privilege"

foreign governments." Judge Albert V. Bryan, visibly shaken by the Government's description of the Petersen documents, called the defendant to come up to the bench for sentencing.

There stood a Government employe uncovered through the recheck of federal workers ordered by President Eisenhower. A single clue had developed proof that Petersen was a "security risk." Judge Bryan sentenced Petersen to serve seven years in a federal penitentiary.

This is but one of numerous cases that have developed since the President's executive order, in 1953, establishing the following criteria for investigating a federal employe's trustworthiness:

"Any criminal, infamous, dishonest, immoral or notoriously disgraceful conduct, habitual use of intoxicants to excess, drug addiction or sexual perversion. Any facts which furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence or pressure which may cause him to act contrary to the best interests of the national security."

Under those standards a Defense Department employe may be loyal. But if he cannot resist that third, tongue-loosening Martini at a cocktail party, he may be discharged as a security risk. A Government secretary in the Atomic Energy Commission may be loyal, sober and efficient. But if she is inclined to gossip about confidential letters dictated by her employer, she is subject to discharge. Certainly in testing liability to "coercion, influence or pressure" by foreign agents, any immoral and perverted sex practices by people on the Government payroll are highly pertinent.

The underlying principle is that a place on the federal payroll is not a *right* but a *privilege*, with the safety of the United States entitled to the benefit of any doubt.

### Blackmail: a Red Weapon

The sordid combination of immorality or homosexuality and blackmail has been a tool of espionage through the ages. Soviet agents are known to delve into the personal lives of figures in American Government for signs of weakness. In 1952, when General Eisenhower was being boomed for the Republican nomination, MVD headquarters in Moscow instructed its operatives to concentrate on the General to procure "any information of a current nature which might be used for bargaining purposes" in the event of his election.

Communists and pro-Communists were directed to deliver to Moscow "complete data on J. Edgar Hoover," including information on his character, hours he spent alone, his associates, advance travel plans on Government business or recreation, hotels and specific rooms assigned to him. A similar order through the Soviet Embassy in Washington called for close scrutiny of the wife of a high-ranking Army officer, now retired.

A married federal official met an attractive girl at a social function in Washington. He later saw her frequently. She became pregnant, and suggested that she be attended by a certain doctor in New York. The physician who delivered her child was on the monthly payroll of a Soviet-front establishment. The father was discharged from his Government position before the next step in the Red scheme—a demand for classified information as the price of silence.

Convinced that research knew no barriers of geography or ideology, a scientist had passed largely harmless information to a Communist cell leader before Pearl Harbor. With the war, he was transferred to a secret defense project engaged in developing a new explosive second only to the atomic bomb in destructive force.

In 1943 he was approached by the same Communist, who went straight to the point: He wanted the formula for the new weapon. The scientist refused, but the Communist agent was blunt: The man had furnished information to the Soviet previously. He would do so now, or pay the price of exposure.

Had the Government employe taken his story to the FBI, he would have been protected. Probably he would have been supplied with a bogus formula to pass to the spy. But the scientist yielded to the Communist threat. He is now serving a sentence for espionage in a federal penitentiary.

The explosive he betrayed was used by the Chinese Reds against American troops in Korea.

The FBI discovered that an attaché of a Red satellite embassy in Washington, known to be an espionage agent, had become acquainted with two Government employes in sensitive positions (how, the FBI never learned). A check revealed that both federal workers were homosexuals—obvious grounds for exploitation by the Communist spy. The two were quietly discharged as security risks; the Red agent was suddenly "re-called" by his home government.

The Communists prey mainly on homosexuals. A Soviet intelligence official, newly defected, furnished American authorities with detailed information on these tactics. A favorite procedure is to lure unstable Americans employed along the Iron Curtain in Germany into homosexual acts, and photograph them with hidden cameras. Often the pressure on the victim is not applied at once. They may be unmolested for years—and then face a demand for cooperation with Red spy rings under threat of exposure.

Homosexuality figured at least in part in the defection to the Communists of Dr. Otto John, whose duties as counterintelligence chief in Berlin made him the West German counterpart of J. Edgar Hoover. John's companion the night he crossed the border into East Berlin was a known Red sympathizer for whom John had developed an unnatural affinity. FBI files document many such cases.

### Risks in the CIA

Since the advent of the Eisenhower loyalty-security program, the Government has discharged 788 homosexuals, or permitted them to resign upon presentation of allegations. The statistics include 469 from sensitive Government agencies dealing directly with national defense or security. When the current loyalty-security screening procedure had been in effect only seven months, the Central Intelligence Agency had ejected 31 individuals for sexual perversion. CIA officials finally awakened to the fact that it was informing the enemy that we had security risks in our first line of security defense. Published reports on Government loyalty-security no longer include figures from the CIA.

To understand the origin of these procedures we must go back to Jan. 23, 1953. That day Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr., took his oath as the nation's new chief law-enforcement officer. On his desk was the secret report he had requested from J. Edgar Hoover of the FBI.

Brownell felt cold sweat of alarm in his palms as he read and reread the document. The head of the FBI was officially warning the incoming Administration of a "clear and present danger" to the country's security.

That warning may now be revealed to the public for the first time. It presented a startling picture of underground Communist penetration of the Government and named individuals who should be seized immediately in the event of war with Soviet Russia—just as the FBI seized Nazi and Fascist agents with Pearl Harbor.

Hoover submitted to his new chief for reconsideration the

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### ... Subversives: "a problem no less urgent than ending the war"

names of 48 Government officials and employees, each cleared under the Truman loyalty program, but who were considered "most critical" cases of Communist infiltration or subversion. Another 165, eligible for federal positions under the old loyalty standards, and on whom the new Administration wished to check, were employees known by the FBI through "evidence or their own admissions" to have present or past Communist affiliations. Beyond that, 17,816 more federal workers, the subjects of previous loyalty investigations on whom there was "derogatory information" in FBI files, had either been cleared under the previous Administration or the FBI had not been notified of the disposition of their cases. These allegations should be proved or disproved, especially where these employees occupied sensitive jobs.

#### Cases from FBI Files

Hoover cited specific examples from his confidential files. To protect the national interest and disguise FBI counterespionage techniques, these cases must be paraphrased even now. The following are typical:

- A State Department Foreign Service officer: Responsible for employment of known Communist spy with direct Soviet Embassy contacts in sensitive position in Justice Department. . . .
- An Interior Department engineer: Employed federal project supplying hydroelectric power to key atomic installation . . . worked early 1940s for Soviet purchasing agency . . . currently contacted by Soviet functionaries, including espionage agents known to be operating among federal workers. . . .
- A Defense Department guard: Signed Communist Party nominating petition in 1946 . . . made speeches idolizing Lenin and Stalin . . . still employed in position passing on admittance of military and civilian personnel to vaults containing "top secret" military film. . . .
- A U. N. Economic and Social Council economist: Member of United Public Workers of America, expelled by CIO for Communist domination . . . arranged blind date for U. N. official with girl connected with Rosenberg atomic-bomb spy ring . . . passenger on Polish ship, S.S. *Batory*, when Communist agent Gerhart Eisler fled to East Germany . . . charged to U. S. quota of U. N. employees. . . .
- A clerk in investigative branch of federal personnel agency: Father and brother Communist Party members . . . father former employee of Russian Embassy and Amtorg . . . active member prior to 1942 in two Communist-front organizations . . . recommended for dismissal as early as 1942 . . . recommendation overruled on appeal by Truman Loyalty Review Board . . . still had access to confidential files on Government workers . . . able to supply information to be used as pressure or blackmail to induce Government workers to serve as espionage contacts. . . .
- A U. S. Information officer: Close association with Communists and Party-liners while attached to American Embassy in Latin America . . . brother-in-law active Communist and Party member since 1933 . . . allegedly used official position to "obstruct, hamper or nullify" American policies designed to embarrass the U.S.S.R. and her satellites. . . .

Brownell closed the file and went straightway to the White House. President Eisenhower shared his concern. He felt that the Hoover report, as summarized by the Attorney General, presented the new Administration with a problem no less urgent than ending the war in Korea. And he ordered immediate development of the loyalty-security program which has ever since been under attack by some critics who consider it a threat to civil liberties.

Among the questions such critics ask are these:

**Is it fair to recheck federal workers previously cleared— isn't that double jeopardy?**

The previously mentioned case of Joseph S. Petersen, Jr.— easily cleared under the Truman program but convicted and imprisoned after a second screening—is sufficient answer to that.

**May Government employees be suspended without pay on the basis of confidential information, given a hearing, and then discharged with no right to confront their accusers?**

The answer is "Yes." And this occasions the most plausible strictures against the loyalty-security program. An employee is dismissed as a result of anonymous charges and is not even allowed to face or question his accuser.

But consider the reason for the policy, and its results.

The Justice Department in 1954 brought charges against five Communist Party members, who conducted Communist training schools and directed infiltration into aircraft and electronic-defense plants in the St. Louis area during the war.

At the trial the defendants were stunned by the parade of Government witnesses. There was Mrs. Anna Hanners, aircraft-plant secretary, who joined the Communist Party in 1942 at the request of the FBI. There was Thomas A. Younglove, a St. Louis cement contractor and an FBI "plant" in the Party since 1945. Then came a Negro minister, the Rev. Obadiah Jones, an undercover agent for the FBI since 1946. They all testified on a wealth of inside information.

#### New Surprise for Reds

If the five Reds were surprised by the revelations from within their own ranks, they were caught completely off guard by the next witness. William Walter Cortor testified that he joined an "electrical fraction" of the Communist Party in 1937, and volunteered his services to the FBI in 1950. Mrs. Mary Kaufman, attorney for two of the Communists, rose from her seat at the counsel table. Normally she was cool and calculating, but now her face twitched in agitation as she asked the judge to send the jury from the room.

Mrs. Kaufman revealed that, even after the trial was under way, Cortor had sat in on a defense-strategy huddle to plan the cross-examination of Mr. Jones. Mrs. Kaufman asserted that the FBI had "interfered with and entered into the defense of this case," and demanded a mistrial. Cortor testified he did not discuss the case with Government lawyers, so the motion was overruled. Finally the jury found the five Communists guilty on the first ballot.

The St. Louis case remains a classic in FBI files. The Bureau had infiltrated so many informants into the inner councils of the party that its agents informed on one another. Only as each individual took the stand to testify did the Government's informers learn the true identity of one another.

The victory was important, but the price paid was heavy. It cost the Government the four agents in the Communist Party whose "covers were blown" when they "surfaced" to testify. Younglove, for instance, had reported some 500 party members and 3000 fellow travelers to the FBI. His lists included defense-plant workers. In security proceedings resulting from his information he had never been identified. Had he appeared at any hearing for confrontation and cross-examination, he would have been expelled from the party long ago. The Government would have been deprived of his decisive testimony in the St. Louis case.

The FBI also gathers information, especially in security cases from doctors, lawyers, ministers, bankers, as well as

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### ... "The Communist Party is today in a state of near-panic"

friends, neighbors and fellow employees. Obviously many such individuals will talk only if guaranteed their names will not be used.

The point is that the "confrontation" demanded by critics of the program would rapidly dissipate and in the end destroy the entire network of Government informants. And let's remember that by information thus obtained and otherwise unobtainable the Communist conspiracy to destroy the very civil liberties we are concerned with here has been weakened.

For the Communist Party is today in a state of near-panic. Eighty-eight of its top leaders have been convicted of the 134 who were indicted, and others are awaiting trial. Thanks to the FBI and the Administration's loyalty-security program, Communist leaders have had to contrive their own system of loyalty-security checks.

Each of the party's estimated 21,000 members must answer a questionnaire more intimate and prying more deeply into individual affairs and thoughts than any questions put to federal employees. The Communists' interrogatory, obtained from confidential Washington sources, includes 34 questions such as these:

Have you had extra-marital relations since you have been married? If so, with whom and how often? If you owe any debts, either to individuals, banks, loan agencies, or as a result of obligations due on purchase of autos, furniture, etc., list the amount owed, and to whom, and for what purpose.

The party's methods in grilling John Lautner, a party member for 21 years whom they suspected of informing, are illuminating. They subjected him to a kangaroo-court procedure reflecting the twisted minds of terrorists. Hungarian-born, bushy-haired, bespectacled John Lautner was lured to Cleveland. Still unsuspecting, he joined a group in the basement of a house. There, in the garish light of a single unshaded light bulb, Lautner was forced to strip and sit on a stool.

A loaded pistol was held at his head. A Communist goon beat the cellar wall with a rubber hose. Lautner's wrists were taped to what he was told was a "lie detector." To escape, Lautner scrawled a dictated "confession." Despite his innocence, he pleaded guilty to being a "Fascist enemy traitor to the working class" and stated that he had received a "fair and impartial" trial.

Lautner's revulsion against such heavy-handed torture brought him to the side of our Government. He was a federal witness in the Smith Act trial which resulted in the conviction of 13 Communist officials for advocating "the overthrow of the Government by force."

### Where to Draw the Line?

Administration officials are the first to admit that any screening of American citizens for loyalty and security poses serious questions. Even Congress, casting aside partisan politics in this politically loaded program, has established a non-partisan commission of 12 to make a six-months' study of the knotty problem: Where is the line to be drawn between the Government's undeniable need of self-protection and an individual's civil liberties?

We should not attempt to answer that question without considering thoughtfully the facts stated in this article. And we should remember that the Eisenhower loyalty-security program must be credited with setting back the Communist conspiracy within the United States and making it increas-

**A** GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE with a long record of service is suddenly summoned to the office of his departmental security officer, where he is handed a formal letter. He blanches as he reads the key sentence: "Certain information has been received indicating that your continued employment may not be clearly consistent with national security."

The letter outlines the charges against him. They add up to "reports" that he and his wife are "intimate friends" of another couple who "were close associates of persons described as having Communist tendencies"; that his sister and her husband had been connected with two organizations listed as Communist fronts by the Attorney General; that guests at a birthday party in his honor included "friends and acquaintances of questionable political orientation."

### Suspension Is Automatic

With the presentation of these charges the employee's suspension—without pay—is automatic. He is not even allowed to return to his desk to pick up personal belongings. These are handed to him as he leaves.

What recourse has an employee so charged? Under regular loyalty-security procedures he has 30 days to file an answer to the charges. If the agency head then refuses to reinstate him he has another 10 days to ask for a hearing before a loyalty-security board, with the limited—right of counsel. His only alternative is to resign under a cloud of unresolved charges.

This man's experience is typical of thousands, as the Government proceeds with its stupendous task of removing from sensitive positions not only disloyal persons but those considered security risks because of personal habits or associations.

"I tried to figure out, driving home, how to tell my wife," one suspended worker told us. "We were married after I'd been in Government for four years—that was 14 years ago—and we have two children. Now, after 18 years, I'd been dropped for being disloyal or a security risk: the letter didn't say which."

"We told our neighbors I was taking leave. But things get around. I knew, from the way people looked at me, that they wondered if I was a spy."

Why didn't he answer the charges and ask for a hearing? "Lawyers cost money," he explained, "and we dipped into our savings with the first missed check. My wife and I talked it over. We were told that the chances were my lawyers couldn't cross-examine Government witnesses and I couldn't confront my accusers. Under those conditions we couldn't see how a man went about proving that his continued employment was consistent with national security."

"Even if I were cleared and got my back pay, we'd still be in the hole financially because of the lawyer's fees. Clearing my name seemed a luxury I couldn't afford. Anyway, I'd always be 'that fellow who was hauled up for security.' So I took advantage of the alternative—I resigned."

One hears many such stories these days. Obviously Government workers or private employees of Government contractors who are discharged or resign on definite proof of guilt do not spread their stories. Nor do they find champions to publicize them—outside of Communist and fellow-traveling circles. It is the weak, badly administered or bungled cases—the striking examples of injustice and blunder—which become public. The worst of these become the objects of loud crusades for rehabilitation and reinstatement.

The widespread concern over this issue is the result, in large part, of the gigantic scale of our loyalty-security opera-

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### ... "Five million employees have been checked and rechecked"

tions. Few Americans realize that the federal government has looked into the personal affairs of one out of every five employed adults. Under six different screening programs, 14 million of the nation's 64 million working population are subjects of confidential files. The heads of 70-odd agencies prescribe their own screening regulations under a broad presidential directive.

Records of all persons whose employment calls for access to defense information are held in special dossiers compiled from secret reports by friends, neighbors, schoolmates and fellow workers. Into the record go judgments on their patriotism, personal character, competence and discretion. For workers in less sensitive jobs the Government has records containing, at least, their names, fingerprints and answers to personnel questionnaires.

To date, five million present and past federal employees have been checked and rechecked. Another five million are officers and enlisted personnel of the armed forces; these have been screened by the Defense Department's own security system. More than three million business executives and employees in private plants with defense contracts have been processed before being permitted to work in electronic, aviation, guided-missile and other classified projects.

Half a million individuals, ranging from professors and scientists to carpenters and bricklayers, have had to be checked and cleared for work on Atomic Energy Commission enterprises. Another half million are seamen and port workers investigated under a special maritime-security act of Congress.

Even private citizens donating their talents for a one-day Government conference encounter the security officer. For example, the Department of Health, Education and Welfare recently produced ink pads to fingerprint public-health experts and pharmaceutical executives called to consult on Salk anti-polio vaccine. Each individual was required to fill out a federal form which features a loyalty oath and warns against drunkenness, sexual perversion and associating with spies.

### Defense Jobs Infiltrated

The Defense Department is convinced that a "hard core" of Reds is in critical spots on private payrolls. Already some 18,000 manufacturing plants in industries directly or indirectly related to defense are covered by the security program, and the Department has asked Congress to extend the screening to additional industries. These include transportation, communications, utilities, mining and smelting, petroleum, steel mills and heavy industry generally.

Critics of the gigantic undertaking point out that of the three million defense workers checked only about 1000 were found to be possible risks; they insist that a blunderbuss of indiscriminate inquiry is being used when the need is to pin-point spies and saboteurs.

Those disquieted by the scale of the program and the number of innocents caught in the toils of investigation often use alarmist language. They talk of a menace to personal liberty, star-chamber proceedings, a trend toward totalitarian methods.

Among the most outspoken critics is Harry P. Cain, former Republican Senator from Washington, now a member of the Subversive Activities Control Board, which determines whether organizations should be placed on the Attorney General's list of Communist fronts.

"Let us never forget," he says, "that in an effort to keep our nation secure at home we have constructed an apparatus that will destroy us if we don't watch out. A whole clique of spies could hardly do as much damage to us as could our failure as a Government to have confidence in our people."

Dr. Vannevar Bush, president of the Carnegie Institution in Washington and a distinguished scientist, has been especially emphatic in opposing what he considers overzealous screening in the scientific fields. "The great question as we try to envisage the future," he said recently, "is whether this madness of ours is a passing phase, or whether it will grow until the free world transforms itself into a replica of the captive world it opposes."

### What Is a Security Risk?

A prominent attorney who has defended both Government- and industrial-security suspects summed up his disapproval of screening policies thus:

"My experience has convinced me of the unbelievable impact of the security program on the life of the individual and his family. The procedures are in many particulars contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and make it almost impossible in a complex case for the accused to exonerate himself.

"There is no objective standard of what is or is not a loyalty or security risk. As a practical matter, a security risk is a person whom a security officer doesn't trust. Most security officers are not of superior intelligence and currently they are motivated by fear that they will make a mistake."

In the light of such criticism, we asked questions of Administration officials, and received these answers:

**Q** Hasn't the Government gone beyond the rule of reason in checking almost every federal agency?

**A** Yes, in a measure. Of 2,300,000 federal jobs, more than 500,000 have been classified as actually or potentially "sensitive." Even such nondefense groups as the American Battle Monuments Commission and the National Gallery of Art now file semiannual loyalty-security reports. Yet many Communist agents have found positions in nonsensitive agencies, then followed a zigzag but well-plotted course through other boards and agencies until they reached sensitive spots where they could influence economic, foreign and defense policies.

It is difficult to imagine why Communists would want to infiltrate the Post Office Department. Yet years ago Reds in the postal service are known to have intercepted mail passing between Leon Trotsky in Mexico and his followers in the United States. Communist assassins used this mail thievery in plotting Trotsky's murder. Also, atomic-energy plants maintain special post-office boxes. A security-cleared plant-protection officer handles all such incoming and outgoing mail. One can see opportunities for a disloyal postal worker.

The Fish and Wildlife Service of the Interior Department also seems a farfetched target for subversion. But with its credentials an enemy agent could obtain access to public lands containing uranium or federal hydroelectric projects supplying power to atomic installations.

**Q** Isn't it going too far to apply loyalty-security tests to such humble workers as clerks, charwomen and janitors?

**A** No. Consider a sensitive position like that of the Defense Secretary. In security terms we cannot ignore the girl who takes his dictation, the messenger who distributes his confidential memos, the clerk who posts his dispatches to commanders overseas, the charwoman who empties his wastebasket.

The job of janitor is traditionally coveted by any espionage agency. Before the war the FBI managed to plant a loyal German-born American citizen in Hitler's consulate in New

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**1** 200 miles away, pilot automatically gets Tacan indication of distance and direction, follows indications accordingly.

**2** Course accurate within 2/10ths of mile, pilot easily finds blacked-out carrier, sets new heading for landing approach.

**3** Knowing direction and distance to the moving flat-top at all times, fuel has been conserved, danger of "missing" carrier eliminated.

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accurately. TACAN (the new Tactical Air Navigation system) provides such a beacon to guide you home.

■ Developed for the Navy by IT&T's Federal Telecommunication Laboratories and manufactured by Federal Telephone & Radio Company, Tacan owes much of its power, range and dependability to the Model SAL-39 Klystron tube, located in the land or ship-based

signals . . . which have been generated within the system . . . to the power required for Tacan's operation. Requiring little or no attention during its long life, the SAL-39 helps assure that the beacons will always be "on the air" as dependable navigation aids.

■ With the addition of the new Klystron developed for Tacan, Sperry now produces more than 85 types of tubes to power other microwave systems—ranging in power from a few thousandths of a watt to many millions of watts and in frequencies covering the microwave radio spectrum. To meet industrial as well as military demands, a complete new plant is now devoted to their design and manufacture in Gainesville, Florida.

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### ... "The controversy revolves around methods, not goals"

York. It paid off. Among other things, he succeeded in secretly installing a new firebox under the furnace grates—with a false bottom. Daily, after office hours, this janitor went through the motions of burning all discarded papers, under the watchful eye of the consulate security officer. As soon as the Nazi left, the janitor tripped a switch that dropped the charred papers through the false bottom into an asbestos-lined box. Each night he delivered the box to another FBI agent in a different location. Piecing together charred scraps, the FBI learned a lot—including the presence of a German spy in a rooming house near the Brooklyn Navy Yard.

**Q A few highly publicized security cases have involved people with foreign names. Is it true that the program is weighted against the foreign-born?**

**A** Place of birth cannot be ignored in meeting this problem. In 1948 the FBI reviewed the origins of leading members of the Communist Party. J. Edgar Hoover reported the results: "Of 4984 reviewed, a total of 4555 or 91.4 per cent were either of foreign birth, married to persons of foreign birth, or born of foreign parents, while 56.5 per cent of the 4984 traced their origins either from Russia or her satellite countries."

This may help to explain why, in screening workers in defense plants especially, those of alien background almost automatically rate a full field investigation.

**Q Does the Government ever knowingly employ loyalty or security risks because they are essential to some project?**

**A** Yes, but rarely. Maj. Gen. Leslie R. Groves, director of the atomic project in World War II, authorized the employment of Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer although security officers could not give him clearance. Nor was Oppenheimer the only one. After the war General Groves informed the AEC that he had "considered it in the best interests of the United States to clear certain individuals for work on the Manhattan Project despite evidence indicating considerable doubt as to their character, associations and absolute loyalty."

**Q Is it possible to achieve 100 per cent loyalty and security by investigating every federal employee?**

**A** No. Even if every official and worker were checked today, there would be no guarantee against their becoming disloyal or security risks tomorrow. One of the tricky intangibles a loyalty-security hearing must decide is: "Is this the kind of person who may decide one day to take the law into his own hands, as Alger Hiss and others did?"

Even forthright critics of the screening program acknowledge that there *are* security risks, that the country cannot overlook their aggregate menace and that Government as well as industry must have the right to fire, or to refuse to hire, persons whose discretion or loyalty is in doubt. Individual miscarriages of justice are reprehensible, but they do not cancel out the need for some kind of screening. The controversy revolves around methods, not goals.

### Red Spies Since 1933

Communist infiltration and subversion are facts too well established to be ignored. As far back as 1933, Red agents, sympathizers and actual spies began to penetrate the Government. In the war years secret Communists reached high positions, and the Democratic Administration found it necessary to discharge loyalty risks from top-rung posts in the White House, the State Department, Treasury Department, National Labor Relations Board, War Production Board and other branches.

President Eisenhower's order expanding and stiffening the

threat. His program has worked well and fairly in the overwhelming majority of cases, but it cannot be denied that some avoidable injustice has been done. The lumping together of loyalty and security risks has frequently proved to be a mistake. In the public view, the man or woman who resigns or is discharged these days may be unjustly suspected of the two most widely discussed charges—disloyalty and sexual abnormality. A clearer and more merciful yardstick for employment, critics suggest, would be "suitability" and "unsuitability."

There is substantial ground also for the charge that security officers have been too quick to act on unproved and unevaluated allegations. Such shotgun suspensions have subjected many people to undeserved trouble, expense and public stigma.

### How Many Are Cleared?

Official statistics show that since October 1953 two out of every five workers who chose to fight charges before hearing boards have been cleared. More recently, Washington lawyers who formed a legal-aid committee to represent employees have won every one of their cases. But it should be remembered that hearings are given only when requested, and that those conscious of their guilt or of the weight of the evidence against them prefer to resign quietly.

In view of the likelihood that the struggle against Communism may last for decades, the loyalty-security problem will remain to plague us. With rechecking of federal employees almost completed, investigations are now largely limited to new applicants, to jobholders transferred to more sensitive posts and to individuals about whom new information is received. A crash program no longer seems indicated. Many students of the issue believe that a uniform and fair code should be developed, with authority and responsibility vested in one carefully chosen official with the rank of Presidential Assistant.

Few deny or minimize the difficulty of the problem. It is, basically, the problem of maintaining a balance between our need for protection against Communist tactics and the liberties guaranteed us in the Constitution. It is, specifically, the question of weighing the civil rights of individuals against the possibility that one of those individuals may betray the trust and imperil the lives of millions.

This is the task facing the 12-man bipartisan loyalty-security survey panel established by Congress, with the approval of the White House. . . . Changes in procedure to give the suspect more protection seem inevitable. The spirit of the inquiry is reflected in this statement by the President:

"All the measures have two purposes. Their first purpose is to make certain that this nation's security is not jeopardized by false servants. Their second purpose is to clear the atmosphere of that unreasonable suspicion that accepts rumor and gossip as substitutes for evidence.

"In the long run you may be certain of this: America believes in and practices fair play and decency and justice. In this country public opinion is the most powerful of all forces, and it will straighten this matter out wherever and whenever there is real violence done to our free rights."

*Foregoing are extracts from a series of two articles, entitled "How About Those Security Cases?" by Richard and Gladys Harkness, appearing in the September and November issues of "The Reader's Digest." The extracts are reprinted by permission of "The Reader's Digest," which holds the*